Adam Mount is an independent scholar who has studied U.S. nuclear strategy, conventional deterrence, and progressive foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists and the Center for American Progress, as well as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.In 2015-16, he directed the CFR Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea, a group of seventeen experts chaired by Adm. Mike Mullen and Sen. Sam Nunn. In 2018-19 he directed, with Andrea Berger, the FAS International Study Group on North Korea Policy, a group of twelve experts from the United States and allied countries that developed a consensus strategy to manage a nuclear-armed North Korea.His other writing has been published by The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Atlantic, and Survival and is forthcoming in International Security. His analysis has appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Politico, AFP, AP, and Reuters, on CNN, MSNBC, BBC, NPR, and CNBC, and in testimony before the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces.He has received funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the MacArthur Foundation, the Korea Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and, jointly, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.He previously taught an annual graduate seminar in nuclear strategy at the George Washington University and international ethics at Georgetown University. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Department of Government at Georgetown and a B.A. from Reed College.

Recent work

Selected work

Conventional deterrence of nuclear use

Recent developments in U.S. policy and acquisitions suggest that conventional forces are assuming a larger role in deterring limited nuclear use. This article explores why and how U.S. officials may seek conventional options to deter a nuclear attack. It argues that, as conventional weapons have become increasingly capable at producing strategic effects in response to a nuclear attack, U.S. officials will be more likely to consider conventional deterrence to be a credible option. They may prefer conventional options in order to avoid the costs, risks, and uncertainty of nuclear threats. To assess why and how U.S. officials may attempt conventional deterrence of nuclear use, the article presents the results of a series of individual, scenario-based “tabletop interviews” with former senior U.S. officials who might plausibly have been consulted on a decision about how to deter a North Korean nuclear attack. The results demonstrate that U.S. officials increasingly consider conventional deterrence of nuclear use to be a viable and valuable capability.International Security, Fall 2025 (forthcoming)

An improved nuclear authorization procedure

A series of proposals to strengthen the procedure a president would use to order nuclear use, including a rigorous system to certify the legality of a presidential decision. After Pranay Vaddi and I recommended a step for the president to communicate with allied leadership prior to nuclear use, the proposal was reflected in the Washington Declaration of 2023.

  • Preparing to consult in a nuclear crisis, Munhwa Ilbo, 3/2024

  • Preventing illegal nuclear use, Foreign Policy, 3/2024

  • Better informing a president’s decision on nuclear use, Lawfare, 11/2020 (with P. Vaddi)

The trouble with nuclear assurance

Nuclear assurance, one of the three stated roles of U.S. nuclear weapons, doesn't work. Recent developments in the U.S.–South Korea alliance suggest that nuclear assurance is not only ineffective at reassuring Seoul but may also be fuelling proliferation risks. By raising the salience of nuclear weapons within the alliance, nuclear assurance reinforces the fiction that South Korea’s defence depends on nuclear use.Survival 65(2), 2023

Atone for Hiroshima

A close look at the history shows many reasons to atone for the U.S. destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but there is also the continued effect it has on the culture and planning in the nuclear weapons enterprise to this day.Foreign Policy, 6/2023

The strategic logic of nuclear restraint

It is manifestly in the American interest that nuclear weapons are never again used in war – but if they are, should the United States retaliate in kind? The article surveys reasons why a symmetrical nuclear response may be against U.S. interests.Survival 57(4), 2015

North Korea policy

A sharper choice on North Korea

M. Mullen, S. Nunn (Chairs), & A. Mount (Director)
Independent Task Force No. 74, Council on Foreign Relations, 9/2016

How to deter a nuclear North Korea

As Washington and Seoul maintained talking points about denuclearization, convened, edited, and contributed to a special colloquium in Survival debating the requirements for deterrence. Papers by Jina Kim & John Warden, Vipin Narang & Ankit Panda, Ian Campbell & Michaela Dodge, and:

  • A. Mount & M. Rapp-Hooper, "Nuclear Stability on the Korean Peninsula," Survival 62(1), 2020

FAS International Study Group on North Korea Policy

A. Mount & A. Berger (Directors)
Federation of American Scientists, 2019

Media